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Introduction to
the Politicalization of the Corporation
By PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG
The increasing politicalization of the large American corporation is pri-
marily the product of changing concepts as to the role of business in the
society set against a background of profound unresolved problems in the
society itself. It is a process that reflects a number of important elements that
have made the large public corporation an appealing and vulnerable target
for groups interested in social reform who hope to utilize the corporation as
an instrument of social progress and the corporate voting process as a vehicle
to dramatize their objectives and to force public debate.
We are concerned with the development of a view of the corporation that
is political, not legal, that looks upon the corporation as a social institution
to be subjected to social controls not as an economic organization to be oper-
ated to achieve economic objectives for shareholders.
THE MANIFESTATIONS OF POLITICALIZA TION
Politicalization of the large public corporation is the involvement of the
corporation in issues of high public visibility assuring the controversy a
prominent place in the press, radio and television.These issues are essentially
social, moral or political in their nature, do not promote and may instead
impair the profitability of corporate operations, and are of interest to the
proponents primarily as citizens, rather than as shareholders.
Politicalization of the corporation is reflected in a variety of ways:
(a) Angry confrontations or disruptions at shareholder meetings.
(b) Picketing, sit-ins, demonstrations, and boycotts.
(c) Bombings, sabotage and burnings.
(d) Harassment and interference with recruiters. Dow, for example,
was the subject of 221 major demonstrations on American cam-
puses in 4 years.1
(e) Demands for the election of blacks, women, and other minority
group representatives on Boards of Directors.
(f) Organization of public interest groups, in some cases financed by
Editor's Note: The author is Professor of Law, Boston University Law School and
the author of "Corporate Responsibility and the Social Crisis," 50 B.U.L. Rev. 157
(ig7o). His lecture was given under the auspices of the Section on Corporate Law
Departments, Clarence E. Galston, Chairman; the Section on Banking, Corporation
and Business Law, Henry Harfield, Chairman and the Committee on Corporation
Law, Gordon D. Henderson, Chairman.
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tax-exempt foundations, investigating the extent of corporate rec-
ognition of social factors in their business operations.
(g) Increasing use of the proxy machinery to attempt to compel man-
agement under S.E.C. Rule 14a-8 to include social questions or
proposals for change in the organic corporate structure in the cor-
porate proxy statements.
One knowledgeable observer of developments in this area has pointed out
that this movement in the corporate world could become the most significant
political development of the 197os.2
As a major factor in the society, the corporation cannot escape involve-
ment in the urgent problems of the country. It is necessarily profoundly in-
fluenced by widespread dissatisfaction on the part of significant elements of
the American society as reflected in the violence of the social scene, the in-
tensity of concern engendered by the war in Viet-Nam, the pre-occupation
with problems of environmental abuse, the development of "consumerism,"
the alienation of many younger persons from traditional values, and the ex-
istence of "revolutionary" movements for "liberation" of blacks and women.
These factors have set in motion vital social forces, together with energetic,
highly articulate, fiercely motivated persons, prepared to devote their ener-
gies to the movement. 197o has thus been described as the year of "the cor-
porate guerilla fighter." 3 The state is regarded as the corporate state, and the
corporation is a prime target.
There are at least eight major factors contributing to the current re-exami-
nation of the fundamentals of the role of American business.
i. The Failure of Business Leadership
The basic explanation for the strength of this movement is the simple fact
that many of the demands are morally sound and that business leadership,
along with the rest of the society, has been unpardonable slow to respond.
The intensity of the country's social and environmental problems, the extent
to which corporations have caused them, the limited response of corpora-
tions to their solution-in brief, the failure of business leadership-have
accelerated the forces for politicalization.
As Mr. Dan Lufkin has put it: "in almost every sphere of social concern,
the corporation which is so bright and capable in its field of technical com-
petence has been sluggish, inept, and unresponsive." 4
2. Changing Concepts as to the Role of Business in Society
The movement for politicalization is inescapably intertwined with the
widespread acceptance by businessmen themselves, as well as by the public
generally, of the concept of corporate social responsibility.
Indeed, one of the most significant developments on the recent American
scene has been the increased public expectations and demands on American
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business with respect to its role in the society, the increased involvement of
the large public corporation in social problem solving, and the widespread
emergence, both among businessmen generally and among the critics of busi-
ness, of a changing concept of business objectives. A simple overriding ob-
jective to make money for shareholders is increasingly being replaced by
business affirmations that the basic role of business is to serve society as well
as to make money. Increasingly, the emphasis is on service to the society.
5
One may of course, inquire whether the felicitous rhetoric is intended to
serve more of a public relations function than an accurate definition of cor-
porate priorities. The fact remains, however, that businesmen-prominent
and powerful-are increasingly speaking in such terms. The vital significance
of such statements is that the objective of service to the society which such
business spokesmen are applying to business inevitably will become the ob-
jective which the public generally will first accept as an appropriate role for
business, subsequently come to expect, and ultimately to demand.6
Common factors thus create pressures both for corporate social responsi-
bility and the politicalization of the corporation. This does not mean, how-
ever, that if business ignored public expectations and demands and refused
to involve itself in the solution of social problems that the pressures for
politicalization would disappear. Quite the contrary. If there is any factor
that is contributing strength to the position of management in resisting ef-
forts to politicalize the corporation, it is the ability to point to a record-
albeit limited-of social participation.
3. The Lack of Accountability of Management
Increased public concern also arises from the essential lack of account-
ability of corporate management reflecting the effective separation of own-
ership and control in the typical large public corporation.7 For practical
purposes, Boards of Directors are self-perpetuating trustees only theoretically
responsible to shareholders not in a position to assert effectively the control
allocated to them under corporate law. Concern has developed as to the
legitimacy of corporate power which is not realistically derived from the con-
sent of shareholders. This lack of standing also makes it difficult for manage-
ment to speak with effectiveness on behalf of the owners of the enterprise.
Further, the theoretical owners, the shareholders, have typically become
temporary investors strongly inclined in the face of problems to sell their
shares.
Accountability by management to shareholders would clearly not end the
matter, but lack of accountability to shareholders or anyone else renders even
more troublesome an already difficult problem.
4. The Concentration of Corporate Economic Power
In 1968, the 500 largest industrial corporations represented approximately
64% of the total sales and 74-4% of the total net profits of all industrial com-
panies.8 Large business has become so powerful that it is not realistic for
persons concerned with social change to consider programs which do not
either involve business participation or a change in business objectives. This
combination of great economic power exercised by management that is essen-
tially unaccountable to shareholders has made the large public corporation
particularly vulnerable. It is a major social force subject to insufficient ex-
ternal controls.
5. The Communications Revolution
The technological revolution in communications is of major importance.
With the development of television, activities which in the past might have
remained obscure, today achieve national and even international promi-
nence. It provides instant publicity for "confrontation" politics or "corpo-
rate guerilla" activities. Public exposure is essential for such tactics, and
public exposure is a particularly effective weapon against business which re-
gards good public relations as an area of fundamental importance and to
which a "bad press" is a matter of deep concern.9 Publicity is the primary
objective of such forces and one that is readily attained.
6. Lack of Responsiveness of the Political System
The political institutions of the society have successfully resisted in many
aspects the impact of social reform groups. Persons disappointed with the
inability of left of center forces to develop a major voice in party machinery
and the electoral process generally have been influenced to turn elsewhere.
Increasingly, as the result of the search for a more vulnerable target, the
corporation, rather than the political structure, has become the recipient of
the political goals and pressures of various youth, anti-war, anti-pollution,
anti-racist, and consumer-oriented organizations.
At a conference of social activists held at Carnegie Mellon University in
April 197o, the keynote speaker, Professor Staughton Lynd, summarized:
"Our inevitable enemy in the coming years is the corporation"; Business
Week reported that "the underlying theme of the gathering was that the
corporation is replacing the university and the government as the scapegoat
of radical dissatisfaction with American society." 10
7. Changing Values
Changing views of the nature and role of the corporation unquestionably
are derived as well from changing personal and social values, particularly
among younger people. Hostility by many young people to the large cor-
porations and to the values which they represent is a well known develop-
ment on the American scene. It is thus not an accident that most of the per-
sons active in Campaign GM and other campaigns for politicalization of the
corporation are surprisingly young. As Anthony Athos points out in his Har-
vard Business Review article entitled, Is the Corporation Next to Fall?:
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"The young, with their radical perception of the world, are destined to shake
business, as they are shaking other institutions." 11
8. Development of a Socially-Oriented Shareholder Power Base
In recent years, there has been a tremendous accumulation of stock owner-
ship by non-profit institutions-churches, foundations, and universities-
which by their nature are particularly sensitive to social issues and non-
economic values. There has been a similar accumulation of stock ownership
by other institutional investors who are becoming increasingly aware of
changing concepts as to the nature of their responsibilities in voting their
shares. Finally, the widespread diversification of stock ownership among 31.9
million Americans, 12 most of whom have a very small economic interest in
the companies in which they hold shares, clearly embraces many individuals
who will be ready to respond to social appeals. In the aggregate, the fore-
going groups present a formidable base of potential support for social reform
movements.
CAMPAIGN GM ROUND I
Campaign GM Round I represents the decisive event in the politicaliza-
tion of the corporation.lB With proposals that it considered only "symbolic,"
Campaign GM Round I made its appeal to the shareholder as a citizen, not
as a shareholder. It was an appeal based on what was alleged to be good for
the country, not on what was good for General Motors, as well as a frank
recognition that what was good for the country might not be good for Gen-
eral Motors, at least in the short-run and perhaps not even in the long-run.
Campaign GM contended that the shareholder's interest as a citizen in the
underlying social problems transcended his interest-in General Motors and
that he should vote as citizen, not as shareholder. Finally, Campaign GM
represented the view that the decision on social reform proposals should not
be made solely by shareholders and that "the [non-shareholder] public
should be part of the decision making process."1 4
As illustrated by Campaign GM, the tactics of the so-called public interest
proxy contest are intended to attract public attention and provoke public
debate, in an effort to arouse public interest to a level of intensity that will
force corporate management to respond. It is a battle for publicity waged
primarily in the communications media to influence the state of mind of
citizens generally. The corporate electoral process in and of itself is not de-
cisive. Its basic usefulness is to provide a platform for public presentation
of the point of view of the protesting group and a device for obtaining pub-
lic exposure.
A basic difficulty of the social reform proposals is that they are made to
attract public attention to social problems and have little relation to the
advancement of the interests of the corporation or its shareholders (at least
in their role as shareholders). Further, they are often made, as in the case of
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Campaign GM Round I, by groups who have become stockholders solely for
the purpose of raising the issue. 15
Campaign GM Round I must be regarded as a considerable success. It
dramatized once and for all the potentialities of the public interest proxy
contest. Further, it shattered for all time the pattern of institutional neu-
trality under which the institutional shareholder, particularly the non-profit
institution, automatically voted its shares for management. As a result of
Campaign GM, American corporate electoral processes have become funda-
mentally changed.
CHANGES IN THE ORGANIC STRUCTURE
OF THE CORPORATION
The demands of the corporate activists have not been confined to the role
of the corporation in society. They have also been directed toward radical
change in the organic structure of the corporation itself. Thus, the original
demand for a shareholders committee for corporate responsibility in Cam-
paign GM Round I has been followed by a similar proposal to Honeywell
and by proposals to Honeywell, 1 6 American Telephone,
16 A and Gulf Oil 17
as well as in Campaign GM Round 1118 calling for broadening the Board to
include representation of special interest groups-employees, consumers, sup-
pliers, dealers or the public generally-or otherwise changing Board selection.
Recently, Mr. Ralph Nader called for what he termed the "populariza-
tion" of the corporation. He suggested that in the large corporation, 5 of 20
directors be elected directly by the public at large in a national election. The
remaining 15 would be elected by shareholders under a proxy system that
would permit the submission of management and opposition slates in a single
corporate solicitation at corporate expense. 19
THE ELECTORATE OF THE NEW
CORPORATE POLITICS
The electorate of the new corporate politics provides a solid base of po-
tential support for the forces of social reform.
Institutional investors generally now hold an increasing proportion of the
outstanding equity securities of the major American corporations. As of the
end of 1970, the New York Stock Exchange estimated that $161. 9 billion or
25.4% of all equity securities of companies listed on the Exchange were held
by institutional holders. With unregistered mutual funds, investment part-
nerships, non-bank trusts, and foreign institutions included, the Exchange
estimated that the total of all institutional holdings would exceed 400/.20
At the outset in reviewing the impact of moral or social considerations
upon the policies of institutional investors, we must distinguish sharply in at
least 2 threshold areas.
Firstly, what is the precise question for decision by the institutional inves-
tor? Is it a question of the policy for new investments, the sale of existing
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investments, or the voting of shares on social reform proposals contained in
a proxy solicitation or other participation in the corporate decision-making
process?
Secondly, will the social proposal involve any significant economic loss to
the subject corporation and its shareholders? In the absence of economic
loss for the corporation and therefore of any adverse economic impact on the
fiduciary's investment in the corporation, the problem facing the institu-
tional fiduciary is significantly changed.
(a) The Non-Profit Institutional Investor
Large non-profit institutional holders provide a major base of support for
social reform proposals. Churches, foundations, and universities with leader-
ship and constituencies possessing objectives and values quite different from
those of business are particularly sensitive to proposals for social reform.
(i) Churches and Foundations
Achievement of social progress rather than maximization of economic re-
turn on investments may readily be regarded as a fulfillment of the objectives
of churches and foundations. This is particularly true of those church de-
nominations which have adopted aggressive social action as a major institu-
tional objective. A possible loss of income or decrease in market value of a
limited portion of its portfolio may not be regarded as a significant price to
pay for immediate association with a social movement of considerable ap-
peal to the leadership and membership of the church.
Until recently, church interest in corporate activities at least on the public
level was restricted to isolated incidents. Church groups brought economic
pressure on the banks participating in the consortium providing financing
to the Government of South Africa.21 The women's division of the Method-
ist Board of Missions sold its Dow Chemical shares with a value of $400,000
in protest over the napalm issue.2 2 Church groups also supported FIGHT in
its struggle with Eastman Kodak over black employment.23
Even as recently as last year, church activity was limited. The sponsors of
Campaign GM Round I, can identify only a few church groups holding an
aggregate of i i,ooo shares24 among their supporters.
Since then, churches have pushed to the forefront of the corporate ac-
tivists.
(a) Four resolutions presented by the Southern Africa Task Force of the
United Presbyterian Church will appear in the 1971 Gulf Oil proxy state-
ment. These call for review of Gulf's operations in Africa, amendment of
Gulf's charter to exclude investment in colonial areas, disclosure of corporate
charitable contributions, and the increase of the Gulf Board to include con-
sumer, dealer, and public representatives. 25
(b) While the United Presbyterian Church as shareholder works within
the Gulf corporate machinery, two agencies of the United Church of Christ
have urged a consumer boycott of Gulf because of Gulf's operations in An-
gola.26 It would be interesting to know whether Gulf shareholder United
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Presbyterian Church supports the boycott of Gulf by the United Church of
Christ agencies.
(c) Six major Protestant denominations, holding 6o,ooo shares of Ameri-
can Metal Climax, Inc. and 143,000 shares of Kennecott Copper Corporation
have asked the two companies to postpone a proposed copper mining ven-
ture in Puerto Rico "until safeguards have been established to protect the
economic, social and ecological future" of the island.2 7 The church groups,
although holding shares with a market value in excess of $7,5OO,OOO, are not
seeking to determine what is beneficial to the companies, to themselves and
their fellow shareholders in the short run and in the long run. They are look-
ing at the problem in terms of what is deemed desirable for the people of
Puerto Rico.
(d) The Episcopal Church holding 12,574 shares has offered a resolution
for the General Motors Annual Meeting calling for amendment of the cer-
tificate of incorporation to require the company to cease manufacturing in
South Africa. 28
The activity of the churches is not simply related to their appraisal of their
own responsibilities in voting their shares. Thus, the appeal to United Presby-
terian Church members was not simply to vote shares of Gulf Oil held by
them in favor of the resolutions submitted by the church. The Southern Afri-
can Task Force of the church went further and urged the church affiliates to
go out and purchase additional Gulf shares to provide additional support for
the proposals. 29 Further, the church has retained the Project for Corporate
Responsibility which was responsible for Campaign GM, to run a "major
proxy solicitation and educational effort."80
Thus, at the present time, various church groups have proposed resolu-
tions relating to social or political questions for consideration at the annual
meetings of four major corporations: American Metal Climax, General Mo-
tors, Gulf Oil, and Kennecott Copper. This is unprecedented in American
corporate history.
Still, other church groups are "evaluating portfolios in terms of such mat-
ters as racial and economic justice, peace, and world development" 3 1 or have
accepted "the responsibility . . . to utilize in a strategic way its economic
power" to achieve social action.1 2
Church groups speak not only with great prestige. They control substantial
funds and can exert considerable economic influence. A church task force
has estimated that perhaps $4 billion dollars of current investments might
be changed to reflect "social and public policy views" of the churches.33 Thus,
the Executive Council of the United Church of Christ, has adopted a rec-
ommendation to invest "a substantial portion, not less than ten percent" of
its unrestricted funds in "high-risk and low-return" investments that will
achieve "maximum social impact." 34
The financial power and moral influence of the church groups clearly rep-
resent major factors influencing the climate of opinion in which corporate
management must operate.
The activities of foundations in this area have not been as prominent. The
Campaign GM Scorecard shows only 2 foundations holding a total of 7830
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General Motors shares voting in favor of Campaign GM proposals. The
Rockefeller and Carnegie Foundations voted with management with reserva-
tions. 3 5 It is also known that a number of foundations are providing finan-
cial support for so-called public interest groups active in promoting the rec-
ognition of social and moral factors in the conduct of corporate affairs.36
There is no reason to suppose, however, that the concern of foundations
with the inter-relation of their investment policies, the voting of their shares,
and social reform proposals will not increase, along with the increasing con-
cern of churches and universities. Thus, the Ford Foundation recently an-
nounced that it is conducting a comprehensive review of its policies and
responsibilities in this area.87
(2) Universities
Educational institutions are another powerful source of potential support
for political and social demands on corporations. The constituents of these
institutions are articulate, alert to public issues, and ready to identify with
the objectives of social reform. Thus, it has been pointed out that for stu-
dents "the University is the most acceptable and vulnerable institution sub-
ject to pressure in support of social needs." 38
Within the universities, the supporters of social protest typically lack any
real participation in the decision-making process. This creates at least two
forces brought to bear to influence the institutional decision. The campaign
to force the university trustees to vote against management on an issue of
social reform becomes a useful device for those interested in a re-allocation
of power within the university. The target is the university structure with the
social issue serving as the rallying point, not as a major end in itself.
Further, the students, faculty, or alumni have no immediate responsibility
for the financial conduct of the university and are consequently insensitive
to the significance of the possible economic impact of the decision on the in-
stitution. The issue is presented as a political question affecting the American
society generally and is so received and evaluated by the constituents of the
university, who respond to the political appeal on the political level.
Thus, in Campaign GM Round I, the details of the proposals, their rela-
tion to the fulfillment of the objectives of General Motors, their impact on
General Motors and on its shareholders, and their relationship to the finan-
cial posture of the university received little consideration in the discussions
of students and faculty. They were essentially irrelevant in terms of the
political considerations involved.
In significant part in response to student pressure, 12 colleges and univer-
sities including Amherst, Antioch, Boston University, Brown, Iowa State,
Lincoln, Oregon, and Tufts holding approximately 65,ooo shares voted in
favor of one or both Campaign GM proposals, and 5 others, including Rocke-
feller, Stanford, Swarthmore, Williams, and Yale holding approximately
196,ooo shares abstained. 9
The problem for universities is of serious proportions in view of the in-
tensity of student and faculty pressure. This is well recognized by university
administrators at Harvard, Yale, Princeton and elsewhere.
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At Harvard, President Pusey appointed a committee of distinguished schol-
ars, headed by Professor Robert W. Austin, and including Professors Louis
Loss and A. James Casner, among others, to advise the university in this area.
The report of the Harvard Committee calls essentially for initial investment
to achieve maximum economic return (excluding only investments that
might best be avoided on moral grounds). Where the university was an in-
vestor, the Committee concluded that the university could not remain pas-
sive since abstention in most cases was a vote for management, nor should it
sell its shares. The committee advised that the university-like any other in-
stitutional investor
.may properly, and sometimes should, attempt to influence manage-
ment in directions ... considered to be socially desirable. ... Certainly
the university should vote its stock on occasion in favor of changes for
the symbolic effect of a great university's taking a position on a social
problem." 4 0
At the same time, the committee called for appointment of a non-financial
advisor to review social implications of the university's investment policies.
4
'
The net effect of the Harvard Committee report is to recognize the respon-
sibility of the university to review social reform proposals on their merits,
to respond to social values in its dealings with management, without, how-
ever, providing any standards to guide the university or its advisor on these
matters other than to observe that drawing a policy line is difficult, as indeed
it is.
Professors Malkiel and Quandt of Princeton agree that the university must
invest for maximum return, subject to moral limitations, should participate
in corporate affairs rather than sell its shares, and cannot avoid social and
moral values in the voting of its shares and other participation in corporate
affairs.4 2
Assuming that an investment survives moral scrutiny, what decision does
the university make on proposals relating to matters "considered to be so-
cially desirable," in the language of the Austin Committee at Harvard, or on
proposals pertaining to the organic structure of the corporation? The issue
of whether employee, consumer, supplier, or dealer members should be
added to the Boards of Directors of General Motors or Gulf Oil or American
Telephone is clearly a political not a moral issue. What standards should
apply? Through what process, and by whom is the decision made? What sort
of administrative apparatus will be required to collect relevant information,
to ascertain the views of the educational community, and to emerge with a
recommendation? What distraction will this create from the basic function
of the university? What abrasive controversy will arise within the educational
community? What impact will the proposal have on the economic prospects
of the investment? What impact will ,the university action have on the
public?
In reviewing the different contexts in which this problem may arise, it is
apparent that the major area calling for an institutional response to a social
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reform proposal is when the issue has been thrust upon the institution by
others who have placed the social reform proposal on the corporate proxy
statement, and the university cannot escape a decision. It may vote in favor,
or oppose, or abstain, or sell its shares, but a decision of some sort is inevita-
ble. This is entirely different from the suggestion that the university utilize
a portion of its endowment by making new investments to achieve social pur-
poses. It is also entirely different from the question when, if ever, the univer-
sity may itself initiate, either alone or with others, proposals for social reform
pertaining to the corporations in which it owns shares.
These are interesting and troubling questions. The university can no
longer escape its responsibility in facing up to them. The Austin Committee
at Harvard has recognized this responsibility and in effect has said that the
university must weigh each social reform proposal on the merits in deter-
mining its action. The patterns of the past have been shattered. The institu-
tion no longer automatically votes its shares for management. This is a deci-
sive contrast to the attitudes of yesteryear. It is a remarkable demonstration
of the success of efforts such as Campaign GM to change the basic pattern of
institutional response. It is a confirmation that politicalization of the cor-
poration has occurred in significant measure and is with us to stay.
(3) Retirement Funds
The foregoing discussion has involved the relation between social pro-
posals and the non-profit institution with respect to the investment of the
institution's unrestricted funds. In many cases, however, the non-profit insti-
tution holds additional funds-of which retirement funds are a prime ex-
ample-for the benefit of participants.
In those cases where the obligation is to pay a pension in a fixed amount,
irrespective of the yield of the retirement fund portfolio, the problem in
effect becomes merged with the overall financial problems of the institution.
In other cases, however, the amount of the pension may be measured by the
performance of the retirement fund portfolio. Here, the economic costs of
the social proposal-if there be any-will be borne by the participants not by
the institution.
A church investment committee may be prepared for a reduced return on
its investment in order to achieve social objectives deemed of importance
to the church. Is it prepared to take the same action with pension funds if
this means a reduction in pensions to retired ministers? Is it prepared to
decide the question itself or would it prefer to refer the question to the
participants on some sort of pass-through voting? Is it prepared to permit a
majority of participants to approve an action which conceivably could mean
the reduction in pensions of all concerned, including an opposing minority?43
The Pension Boards of the United Church of Christ are considering an
interesting solution to this dilemma. They are exploring a proposal that re-
tirement funds be divided into two separate funds. One fund would seek
"to provide the best return over the long run consistent with the preserva-
tion of principal." The other would consist of "investments which might be
made to maximize social impact" involving "lower yields or greater risk."
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A participant would be allowed to allocate "some portion of current con-
tributions" for his account to the second fund. The highly restricted nature
of the proposal confirms that at least this church agency is not prepared to
achieve social gain by imposing an involuntary sacrifice upon pensioners.
44
The same type of problem arises in the case of fiduciaries managing pen-
sion funds unassociated with any particular institution, such as the College
Retirement Equities Fund ("CREF") with over $1.3 billion dollars of equity
securities in its portfolio as of December 31, 1969.45 It is worthy of note that
the trustees of CREF voted its 6o8,ooo shares of General Motors in favor of
management and against the two Campaign GM Round I proposals by the
narrow vote of 9 to 7.46 Neither of such proposals, it should be emphasized,
involved any immediate economic loss to General Motors. One may inquire
whether CREF trustees would have felt free to support those Campaign GM
Round I proposals omitted from the corporate proxy statement which would
have involved significant economic loss to General Motors.
One may also inquire whether the beneficiaries of CREF would have
reached a 9 to 7 division if they had been polled on the matter.
When we move from the retirement plans of non-profit institutions to the
pension or profit sharing plans of business corporations, significant differ-
ences may be noted. The trustee, institutional or otherwise, has been hand-
picked by the Board of Directors of the company in question, which custom-
arily retains the power to remove the trustee and designate its successor. The
views of the trustee thus are apt to reflect in some degree the values of the
Board of Directors of the employer. Contrast this posture with the eight trus-
tees of CREF who have been elected by the faculty participants in the plan
and therefore reflect faculty attitudes on a representative basis.
Further, in the case of the industrial pension fund, the results of the opera-
tion of the trust portfolio will increase or decrease the current and future con-
tributions by employers.The benefit of performance enures to the employer,
and the pressure will clearly be for economic rather than social performance.
Similarly, where the industrial fund is a profit-sharing fund, the amount of
the ultimate distributions to beneficiaries will reflect the economic perform-
ance of the fund, and the trustees will be under pressure to maximize return.
The question of pass-through voting by beneficiaries deserves at least brief
mention. Messrs. Lewis and John Gilbert list no less than 41 well-known
corporations that are using pass-through voting procedures for company
shares held under pension, profit-sharing, stock-purchase, thrift and similar
plans.4 7 These examples pertain only to the voting of the shares of the com-
pany establishing the plan, and not to the entire portfolio. The pass-through
practice is obviously designed to eliminate the conflict of interest inherent in
direct or indirect management influence on the voting of the shares held
under such plans with respect to their own election as directors or other
management proposals.
This widespread development illustrates the feasibility of the pass-through
voting system as a general matter. However, its use in the cases mentioned
above rests essentially on the disqualification of the trustees in view of the
inherent conflict of interest involved. The question remains whether trustees
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may abdicate their responsibilities and properly permit decisions in the
social reform area to be made by the beneficiaries, where they are not so
disqualified.
(b) Mutual Funds and Insurance Companies
Other institutional investors, such as mutual funds and stock insurance
companies, are organized with economic, rather than non-profit, objectives.
In the case of mutual funds, a number of factors make them unlikely sources
of support for social reform. The interest of management and shareholder
alike in performance records necessarily emphasizes short-run economic con-
siderations. Appeals to shareholders, as citizens rather than as shareholders,
will be less effective. Further, since the funds are investors in other businesses
and not directly conducting industrial or commercial operations themselves,
they are effectively insulated from participation in the sensitive areas of so-
cial and environmental concern. Their activities do not produce issues of
high public visibility. -Finally, we are dealing with boards which, as a prac-
tical matter, are even less accountable to shareholders than the companies in
which they invest, because of the reduced significance of institutional share-
holders. Thus, the ultimate decision is likely to reflect the personal predilec-
tions of the Board. At the same time, one can visualize a limited number of
funds deliberately appealing to socially conscious investors through well
publicized plans to invest with social considerations as one of the major ele-
ments influencing investment decision. 48
It is also possible to envisage the development of an awareness among insti-
tutional investors that management sensitivity to social issues may constitute
an index of the superior businessman, whose decisions in other areas may
also be expected to reflect long-range vision. The company that displays so-
cial responsibility may thus attract future professional investor support be-
cause of anticipated performance in the basic economic aspects of the business
arising from the broader horizons demonstrated in the social area.
Insurance companies present a different problem because they are essen-
tially public institutions embracing millions of policy holders. They will find
it increasingly difficult to avoid responding to public pressures, particularly
in the case of prominent public interest confrontations. Mutual insurance
companies are especially vulnerable in this regard. Indeed, it is not difficult
to visualize the politicalization of the mutual life insurance company itself.
If this were to occur, mutual life insurance companies could play a leading
role in this area.
(c) Political Figures and Governmental Trust Funds
Another obvious source of support in the politicalization of the corpora-
tion is the traditional political process itself. Political figures recognizing the
mass appeal of the social proposals hasten to participate. Thus, in Campaign
GM Round I, Mayor Lindsay of New York City instructed the trustees of
New York City pension funds to vote their 162,ooo General Motors shares in
favor of the Campaign GM proposals. Other political support came from
Mayor White of Boston, the San Francisco city pension fund and from Wis-
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consin and Iowa state funds. Six United States Senators and 22 Congressmen
also endorsed Campaign GM Round 1.4 9 Recently, Senator Metcalf of Mon-
tana who had not endorsed Campaign GM Round I, criticized the failure of
universities to try to influence racial, environmental safety, and pricing poli-
cies of the corporations in which they held shares in terms which followed
closely the arguments of Campaign GM. 50
(d) The Small Shareholder
We have already pointed out that the widespread distribution and frag-
mentation of equity ownership has created a class of 31.9 million sharehold-
ers, most of whom have a relatively petty economic stake in the enterprise in
which they are theoretically part-owners. 50 A For such small holders, emphasis
on social, rather than economic, corporate objectives will not realistically
result in any significant economic impact upon them as individuals, even
in those cases where the proposal involves economic cost to the corporation.
This is not to suggest that these small holders may not in significant numbers
regard themselves as owners and may not indeed identify psychologically
with the giant corporations in which they may hold a few shares. Neverthe-
less, as social attitudes change, increasing numbers of small investors may find
their own attitudes changing, and since their own economic position will be
for practical purposes unaffected, may be more responsive to such appeals on
the political level as those being made by Campaign GM and by the church
groups.
By themselves, the small shareholders are unorganized and ineffective.
With the leadership and organization of public interest groups and the par-
ticipation of church, university and other institutional holders, small inves-
tors in the future may play an increasingly important role.
The potential base of support for social reform proposals is thus substan-
tial. Whether or not a successful combination can ever be assembled to out-
poll management 51 is not really the point. If social reformers can achieve
significant support in the balloting process, management will be forced to
respond to shareholder, as distinct from public, pressure. As time goes on, the
use of the corporate balloting process as a method of determining corporate
policy may ultimately emerge as an end in itself, and not simply as an inter-
stitial publicity device in a campaign to influence public opinion.
THE SIGNIFICANCE OF S.E.C. RULE 14a-8(c)
Rule 14a-8(c) 5 2 determines what shareholder proposals may be omitted by
management from its proxy solicitation and would appear to be destined as
one of the major legal battlegrounds in the struggle to politicalize the cor-
poration. The decision of the Commission in Campaign GM Round I in-
cluding 2 proposals and excluding 7 illustrated the crucial significance of the
Rule, which Judge Tamm's opinion in the Medical Committee for Human
Rights5 3 case has catapulted into the forefront of legal attention.
In November 1970, then Chairman Budge of the Commission announced
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that the Commission was studying possible changes in Rule 14a-8. 5 4 Its ulti-
mate decision in this matter will fix the ground rules for future public inter-
est proxy contests.
THE ALTERNATIVES OPEN TO MANAGEMENT
What can management do to reduce the impact of the politicalization of
the corporation. The basic answer for business is to recognize the moral
soundness of most of the demands for social reform and the wisdom of re-
sponding vigorously to the social and environmental crisis. This must be the
basic objective of business. Such tactical measures as studies of the types of
security measures to be adopted to prevent disruption of the Annual Meet-
ing possess only secondary importance. 5 5
Business is already doing much and must do much more in the solution
of the major social and environmental problems of the times, in the struggle
to deal with urban problems, poverty, race relations, product safety and en-
vironmental abuse. I will restrict myself to four brief examples of priority
areas for management: A sharp increase in financial support for social and
philanthropic agencies; minority group representation on the Board; the role
of "outside" directors; and response to the environmental crisis.
i. Increase in Philanthropic Support. Few companies expend the 5% of
pre-tax net income which the Internal Revenue Code permits corporations
to deduct for qualified philanthropic contributions. Contributions of this na-
ture enable business to support the entire spectum of agencies that are deal-
ing with social needs, as well as traditional areas such as higher education.
In 1968, the average for all corporate taxpayers was only 1.o6% of pre-tax
net income,5 6 and it is apparent that in the area of philanthropic efforts,
most business is still not prepared to expend amounts that will significantly
reduce earnings per share. In view of the magnitude of the problems of so-
ciety, the campaign to raise average corporate contributions to a figure closer
to the 5% of pre-tax income deductible under the tax laws is one of the
great challenges facing business leadership. This is a matter of the general
attitude of business with respect to what constitutes an acceptable level of
social costs. If enough businessmen of courage will take the lead, business
will be demonstrating its concern for social betterment in unmistakable terms
that will provide it with a considerably stronger position from which to re-
spond to the social reformers who would seek to alter the structure of busi-
ness itself.
There may be concern as to the designation of recipients as well as the
control exerted by business over the recipients, particularly if contributions
increased significantly. Concern of this nature has been particularly ex-
pressed with respect to business support for higher education. 57 One answer
to such concern is the "matching gift" where the recipient is chosen by the
employee, not the employer. Extension of the "matching gift" principle to
all tax-exempt philanthropic activities and extending it to shareholders, as
well as to employees, would be a dramatic acknowledgement of corporate
responsibility for participation in the solution of social problems.
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2. Minority Group Representation. In the area of race relations, the ab-
sence of blacks and other minority group persons on the Boards of Directors
of major corporations presents a serious social problem. Thus, a recent re-
port entitled, "Corporate Apartheid-California, U.S.A. Style," bitterly crit-
icized California's 67 largest corporations, pointing out that not one of the
i,oo8 members of their Boards of Directors was black or Mexican-American
and that only 6 were women.58
Similarly, in its recent report to President Nixon, the National Advisory
Council on Minority Business called for appointment of persons from minor-
ity groups to the boards of directors of the largest corporations.
5 9
This view is a long overdue recognition of the legitimate aspirations of de-
prived groups of Americans to participate in the important decision-making
centers of power in the American society. It is a conservative effort to widen
the stake of deprived groups in the existing order.
It is gratifying to note that leading corporations are responding and that
the pattern of American corporate life is changing, with the election of black
members to the Boards of such leading corporations as
Chase Manhattan Bank
Columbia Broadcasting
Commonwealth Edison
Equitable Life Assurance Society
First National City Bank
General Motors
Girard Trust Bank
Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea
Michigan Consolidated Gas
Pan American Airways
Prudential Life Insurance Company
Standard Oil of Ohio
Westinghouse Broadcasting
W. T. Grant 60
Major American business is beginning to correct the injustices of the past,
but it is obvious that the process has just commenced.
3. The Role of "Outside" Directors. As noted, a significant number of the
social reform proposals relate to the organic structure of the corporation,
involving such suggestions as shareholder committees for corporate respon-
sibility, the election of directors nominated by or representing employees,
suppliers, consumers, or dealers or the inclusion of competing slates of direc-
tors in the corporate proxy solicitation. These proposals highlight the im-
portance of the "outside" director on the Board, and the ultimate strength
of proposals of this nature, will depend on the extent to which so-called
"outside" directors introduce a different perspective into board deliberations
and decisions, and in practice as well as theory, function as public directors.
Where such "outside" directors are not truly independent of management-
as in the case of counsel, or investment bankers, or commercial bankers-all
vitally interested in preserving business opportunities for their own firms
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and not in a position to tangle with management, they are not free to repre-
sent the public, either the limited public of the shareholder or the wider
public of the community generally.
Business must recognize these wider responsibilities and have genuine
"outside" directors free to represent public attitudes and expectations. If it
fails to do so, it may face increasing pressure for "outside" directors who
would represent not the interests of public shareholders or the general pub-
lic, but the specialized interests of employees, consumers, suppliers, or deal-
ers or similar groups.
4. The Environment. In the environmental field, the intensity of public
demand for corrective action has reached such overwhelming proportions
that business has lost much of its freedom of choice. It must respond vigor-
ously. 60A In this area, Weyerhauser provides an example of what may be ac-
complished by businessmen with the long view. Operating in the paper and
pulp industry, which faces some of the most difficult air and water pollution
problems in the American economy, Weyerhauser has received outstanding
recognition for its affirmative efforts to deal with the problem. Organizations
as diverse as Business Week in its 197o Awards for Business Citizenship, 6 1
The Council on Economic Priorities in its study of the paper and pulp indus-
try,6 2 and the Sports Foundation 6 3 have singled it out for commendation.
This illustrates how business cannot only prevail in the battle for public
opinion, but can achieve favorable recognition.
May I conclude with a reference to the statement of the Board of Trustees
of The Rockefeller Foundation issued in explanation of its position on the
Campaign GM Round I proposals. This deserves the most serious attention,
both because of its eloquence and because of the composition of the Board
including such distinguished representatives of the business community as
John D. Rockefeller III, C. Douglas Dillon, Robert Roosa, Frank Stanton,
and Thomas Watson.
The Rockefeller Foundation trustees stated that:
"The corporations of America must assert an unprecedented order
of leadership in helping to solve the social problems of our time ....
What is needed from business today is leadership which is courageous,
wise and compassionate, which is enlightened in its own and the pub-
lic's interest and which greets change with an open mind." 64
An extensive degree of politicalization of the corporation has already oc-
curred. The pressures for further politicalization will continue to increase
and may ultimately change the structure and objectives of American corpo-
rate enterprise unless business has the wisdom and strength to respond to
the moral imperatives of our times and to display in the language of the
Rockefeller Foundation trustees an "unprecedented order of leadership in
helping to solve the social problems of our time."
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